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I. INTRODUCTION
Until quite recently, it has rarely been claimed that section 337
of the Tariff Act of 1930 (section 337),' was or should be an antitrust
statute. In a recent article on section 337 jurisdiction,, it is reported
that in nine cases prior to 1972, the Tariff Commission, through a
process of informal dismissal of complaints, refused to investigate
matters of a suspected antitrust nature. In one case of relatively
recent vintage, Ceramic Wall Tile,I the Tariff Commission was pre-
sented with a complaint charging Japanese manufacturers and U.S.
importers with price fixing, predation, customer and market alloca-
tions, and attempted monopolization, among other unfair acts. The
complainants stated in their pleadings that although antitrust and
other laws covered the complained-of acts, relief was sought under
section 337 because relief under the antitrust laws was
"inadequate." The Tariff Commission dismissed the case, stating in
part:
The Commission is of the view that inadequacy of relief afforded
under the antitrust and other statutes claimed to be violated can-
not be presumed. The Commission is further of the view that an
investigation under section 337 is not warranted in the premises
unless the acts or practices complained of have been dealt with
under the antitrust laws or section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act and the relief afforded. under these statutes has been
found wanting.'
* The views expressed in this article are personal to the authors and are not necessarily
those of the Department of Justice.
** Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, United States Department of
Justice; Member, New York Bar.
*** Staff Trial Attorney, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, United States
Department of Justice; Member, Washington Bar.
U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. V 1975).
Kaye & Plaia, The Relationship of Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Law to Section
337 Jurisdiction of US. International Trade Commission, 2 INT'L TRADE L. J. 1,9-27 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Kaye & Plaia].
I Ceramic Wall Tile, (Tariff Comm'n, filed Mar. 29, 1966). See also Kaye & Plaia, note 2
supra, at 15-16.
Id., Letter of Commission Secretary (May 10, 1966).
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
This deference is notwithstanding the fact that the final clause of
section 337 sounds like an antitrust statute. It reads:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation
of articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner,
importer, consignee, or agent of either, the effect or tendency of
which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently
and economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the
establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize
trade and commerce in the United States are declared unlawful
. . 5 (emphasis added).
Then, Congress amended section 337 in the Trade Act of 1974 (the
Trade Act).' The first important suggestion that section 337 might
be an antitrust statute is contained in the report as to these amend-
ments of the Senate Finance Committee. It states that "[t]he
Committee believes that the public health and welfare and the as-
surance of competitive conditions in the United States economy
must be overriding considerations in the administration of this stat-
ute."7 Recently, the able current Chairman of the International
Trade Commission (ITC), Daniel Minchew, has been developing
and articulating his understanding of the Finance Committee's
admonition."
This new development, and the new energy with which the ITC
and its section 337 legal staff are developing a program to enforce
this statute, makes it appropriate to take a fresh look at its problems
and possibilities as an antitrust law in areas of investigation, such
as international predatory pricing, foreign cartels affecting domestic
commerce, and anticompetitive distribution practices dictated from
abroad.
II. SECTION 337 As PROTECTION FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS
While the statute has antitrust potential, for the first 50 years its
primary purpose was to protect the property rights of American
producers, largely ignoring competition considerations. For an im-
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (Supp. V 1975).
Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified in large part, at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (Supp.
V 1975)). Section 341 of the Trade Act amended section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. V 1975).
' SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 197, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7330 [hereinafter cited
as FINANCE COMM. REP.I.
See, e.g., Remarks of ITC Chairman Daniel Minchew on Section 337 before the World
Trade Institute, New York, N.Y. (Oct. 17, 1977). The Trade Act changed the Tariff Commis-
sion's name to the International Trade Commission. 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (Supp. V 1975).
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porter to infringe the property rights, broadly defined, of a United
States producer, is to engage in "unfair methods of competition"
within the statutory language regardless of the effect these imports
have on competition in domestic markets. The first clause of the
section is dominant. This was established in Frischer & Co. v.
Bakelite Corp.' There, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
held, in 1930, that a finding of infringement by the Tariff Commis-
sion of a United States patent was an unfair act under the predeces-
sor to section 337. This holding was asserted even though the ITC
is not authorized by law to make final factual determinations of
patent infringement." Most section 337 enforcement actions for the
next forty years were limited to the protection of American patent
holders against importers of similar and competing foreign goods,
whether or not a district court in fact ultimately upheld the patent
infringement determination of the Tariff Commission.
In one recent study it has been determined that 70 percent of all
American patents judicially challenged for validity between 1967
and 1971 were legally invalid." Moreover, enforcement of an invalid
patent (patent misuse), or the obtaining of a patent by fraud, may
be violations of existing antitrust laws. 2 In many section 337 actions
brought over the years there was neither close investigation of pat-
ent misuse defenses nor ultimate vindication in a trial court of the
Tariff Commission's findings of infringement.
For example, in the Tariff Commission's 1971 Ampicillin investi-
gation,"' complainant drug companies sought exclusion of imports
of ampicillin on the grounds that their U.S. patents were being
infringed. The Tariff Commission was informed that the Depart-
ment of Justice was conducting a current, active investigation of
possible antitrust activity by these complainants to the detriment
of these importers, including possible patent misuse. This investiga-
tion subsequently culminated in a patent-based antitrust action."
Nevertheless, the Tariff Commission refused to terminate its inves-
39 F.2d 247 (C.C.P.A. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 852 (1930).
" FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 7, at 196.
D. DUNNER, J. GAMBRELL & I. KAYTON, PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES, 1971 DEVELOPMENTS,
app. 2, at 38 (1971). This study examined 292 court of appeals validity holdings and found
only 89 patents upheld or valid.
I2 Morton Salt v. Suppigger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (invalid patent enforcement); Walker
Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (fraudu-
lent procurement).
" Ampicillin, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 345 (Nov. 1970). [hereinafter cited as Ampicillin].
" United States v. Bristol-Meyers Co., Civ. No. 822-1250 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 19, 1970).
(patent based antitrust action).
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tigation, only doing so reluctantly, after Judge Sirica suspended
enforcement of Commission subpoenae to the importers. 5
In the Furazolidone5 section 337 investigation, the issue of a mar-
ket division between the complainant and its licensee was raised by
the Department of Justice. Two members of the Tariff Commission
found the market division a "reasonable" restraint of trade and
voted to recommend an exclusion order. 7 Other enforcement actions
over the years in which property rights, besides patent rights, were
vindicated regardless of competitive considerations involved issues
such as mislabeling'8 and deceptive marketing ("passing off"). 9 As
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals found in 1934 as to section
337's predecessor, this statute was "intended to shelter, protect and
conserve the industries of the United States."' "
Merely to declare that section 337 should be an antitrust statute,
or even to employ it as an antitrust statute in a few investigations,
does not insure that its primary purpose will not remain the protec-
tion of property rights regardless of competitive effects. This con-
cern is illustrated in a recent section 337 patent case, Reclosable
Plastic Bags.' There the ITC held a patent valid and infringed in
the presence of evidence that the patent owner was engaged in
worldwide licensing activities aimed at restricting trade in the arti-
cle to the point that significant patent misuse was committed. The
legal position of the ITC in this case reflected a narrow view of
patent misuse rather than what one might expect from an antitrust
enforcement agency.
III. SECTION 337 As PROTECTION FOR EXISTING MARKET POSITIONS
One antitrust objective which fits the new aggressive antitrust
posture of the ITC is protecting hard-pressed domestic producers
against predatory conduct by foreign exporters. It should be noted,
in passing, that the ITC lacks jurisdiction to protect, conversely
hard-pressed foreign exporters against predatory conduct by domes-
" Ampicillin, supra note 13.
' Furazolidone, Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 299 (1969) (Statement by Commissioners Sutton
and Newsom).
Id. at 17.
" Manila Rope, docket no. 5 (April 1927). Section 316, section 337's predecessor, created
the first jurisdiction over unfair trade practices in import trade. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 353, §
316, 42 Stat. 943.
" Cigar Lighters, Investigation No. 337-TA-6 (1933).
" In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458, 465 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
21 Certain Reclosable Plastic Bags, Investigation No. 337-TA-22, I.T.C. Pub. No. 801 (Jan.
1977).
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tic producers in United States markets. This presumably is left to
other antitrust laws.
Predatory conduct exists where it can be shown that a domestic
producer is the target of a sustained sales campaign by his foreign
competition at prices so low that they realize losses over an ex-
tended period, and that these ruinous prices are adopted not to gain
a foothold in the market, not to meet existing competition (which
are legitimate purposes) but rather, for the primary purpose of put-
ting him out of business. Once this is done, the competition can
thereafter be expected to raise prices dramatically and reap monop-
oly profits at the consumer's expense.22 True predation is probably
found infrequently in today's national economic markets because it
is costly, may lead to criminal sanctions if discovered, and raises
serious risks that the predator will put himself under before burying
his competition.23 Nevertheless, understandably, hard-pressed
producers are frequently convinced that their toughest competitors
are predators.
Existing antitrust laws, as acknowledged by the ITC in the
Ceramic Wall Tile opinion quoted above, provide adequate reme-
dies if true predation can be proved. Perhaps the greatest problem
with winning even true predation cases is that judges and juries are
reluctant to find that low prices today may injure the ultimate
consumer tomorrow.24 Costly birds in the bush are insufficient dis-
traction from cheap birds in the hand. Even if antitrust enforcement
officials are too skeptical about the infrequency of true predation to
know it when they see it and "properly" enforce the law, the Sher-
man Act provides a private treble damage remedy for injured enter-
prises. District court juries and judges can do what federal officials
ignore. Recent jurisdictional decisions such as Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Matsushita Electrical Ind. Co., Ltd.25 make it unlikely that any
alleged foreign predator with significant sales in the domestic mar-
ket will escape the reach of the Sherman Act in private litigation.
But even if section 337 is a potentially valuable supplement to
existing antitrust laws, it is not clear that the ITC doesn't already
See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 43 (1977) for a basic discussion of predatory practices.
23 The economic and legal difficulties of successful predatory conduct are described in
Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975). But see Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and
Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L. J. 284 (1977).
2 See, e.g., International Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 722-
25 (5th Cir. 1975).
25 402 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
1978]
GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L.
have sufficient statutory authority to reach predation under the
Antidumping Act of 1921.12 Under the 1921 Act, price discrimination
between home and American markets which causes or threatens
injury to an American industry is actionable by the Treasury. The
ITC determines whether domestic complainants have sustained
dumping injury, after the Treasury has determined that de facto
price discrimination (sales in the United States at less than home
market prices) exists.27 The remedy under the 1921 Act is a special
duty which has the effect of equalizing prices in the two markets.
Amendments to the 1921 Act in the Trade Act provide that where
sales in foreign and American markets are at prices which are below
cost but identical, the 1921 Act may be applied to raise foreign
prices to a cost plus eight percent profit level.28 Since international
predatory pricing will involve either price discrimination or below
cost sales in United States markets, the 1921 Act would appear to
be applicable.
In the recent Color TV Sets29 section 337 case, involving allega-
tions of predatory behavior, the conflict between Treasury's investi-
gation of dumping under the 1921 Act and the ITC investigation of
predatory behavior under section 337 was explicit. In a letter to the
ITC, the Secretary of the Treasury stated in regard to section 337:
"[I]t must be concluded that the Commission cannot properly con-
duct investigations of allegations which clearly fall within the scope
of the Antidumping Act . . . . 3
The risk, from a pro-competitive standpoint,of enforcement
against predation, is that it is often possible to mistake aggressive
but fair competition for predation. Foreign competitors, who are
often seeking to improve American consumer choice and lower mar-
ket prices without mislabeling or infringing valid patents, are doing
nothing more "unfair" than engaging in vigorous competition. A
domestic producer who finds himself unable to compete effectively
against a foreign exporter with newer technology, lower wage costs,
21 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-170 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). There is also a 1916 Antidumping Act under
which predatory dumoing is actionable both by the Department of Justice in a criminal
proceeding and by private parties in a treble damage action. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970).
27 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-170 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2, 19 U.S.C, § 164 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
21 Certain Color Television Receiving Sets, Investigation No. 337-TA-23 (I.T.C., filed Jan.
15, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Color TV Sets].
10 Id. Letter from William E. Simon (Sept. 23, 1976). Similar letters were sent by the
Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission, Department of State, and President's
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. See Minchew & Webster, 8 GA. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 37 n.46-50 (1978).
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more productive labor and greater marketing assistance from his
home government than our government provides U.S. business, is
often going to view that competitor as unfair. But, put simply, this
kind of unfairness-if indeed it is unfairness at all-has very little
to do with the antitrust laws. The purpose of the antitrust laws, in
fact, is to promote this kind of unfairness, to free markets from those
kinds of restraints which exclude the person producing the better
product at a lower price. What may be unfair for the domestic
producer fighting for his economic life is just what is most fair for
the American consumer, the ultimate beneficiary. If section 337 is
to be enforced as an antitrust statute, enforcement must express the
interests of the ultimate consumer, even when that conflicts with
the valid interests of domestic industry and labor in self-
preservation. If section 337 is to be an antitrust statute it must be
enforced differently from the other purely protectionist legislation
which the ITC administers such as escape clause, tariff revision, and
relative cost of production statutes."
IV. THE RELATION OF SECTION 337 TO TRADITIONAL ANTITRUST
LEGISLATION
Since protection of the property rights of domestic manufacturers
has no necessary relationship to antitrust enforcement, and since
much of the problem of predation by foreign exporters aimed at
domestic manufacturers can be addressed under the Antidumping
Act," it is not immediately clear for what antitrust enforcement role
section 337 is appropriate. While Congress made it clear that the
ITC was to have antitrust jurisdiction under the statute as amended
in the Trade Act, the precise focus of that jurisdiction was not
articulated.3
The Sherman, Clayton, Wilson Tariff, and Federal Trade Com-
mission Acts, the core of traditional antitrust legislation, are broad
and flexible enforcement tools. This is especially true of the Sher-
31 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2253, 2436 (Supp. V 1975), 19 C.F.R. pt. 206 (1977) (escape clause);
19 U.S.C. § § 1841, 1845 (1970), 19 C.F.R. pt. 205 (1977) (effect of tariff concessions); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1336 (1970), 19 C.F.R. pt. 202 (1977)(Investigations of Cost of Production). The term
"protectionist legislation" generally refers to statutory schemes which provide, like the escape
clause, for domestic industries or labor to qualify for tariff increases or similar relief from
injurious but fair foreign competition based on some comparative advantage held by the
foreign competition, such as lower labor rates or raw material costs.
32 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-170 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
11 FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 7, discusses the ITC's jurisdiction over "alleged unfair
methods of competition or unfair acts" in import trade without any greater specificity as to
possible violations of the statute beyond enforcement of rights.
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man Act, as construed in the American Tobacco4 case before World
War I, and the Alcoa," I.C.1,11 and Watchmakers 7 cases more re-
cently. As the "effects" doctrine has developed, conferring subject
matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act over foreign acts by
domestic and foreign persons which have direct, substantial and
foreseeable anticompetitive effects in United States commerce, 8
many if not most significant foreign export practices which have an
anticompetitive effect in the United States can be reached under
the Sherman Act." The Sherman Act is not only enforced by the
Department of Justice, but by private "attorneys general," promot-
ing competition through the prosecution of private antitrust
claims. 0
One possible justification for adding section 337 to the roster of
antitrust statutes in force is the perception that there is a practical
problem in obtaining not subject matter, but in personam jurisdic-
tion over some culpable foreign exporters. Section 337 jurisdiction
is not over the person but over the imported goods which are the
instruments of illegality. It is in rem jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction
over the person cannot be effected, it makes good sense to repose
jurisdiction in the offending product which can be seized. In fact,
in rem jurisdiction is already provided for in section 6 of the Sher-
man Act and section 76 of the Wilson Tariff Act." These statutes
provide long-standing authority in the Attorney General to seize
property which is the subject of antitrust violations both to establish
jurisdiction and, if necessary, to provide the means for effecting
relief from the violation. In fact, section 76 of the Wilson Tariff Act
was invoked several times between 1928 and 1931 for just this pur-
pose ."
4 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
(main opinion); 105 F.Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (opinion on relief to be granted).
11 United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., [1963] TRADE
CASES (CCH) 70,600 (main opinion); [1965] TRADE CASES (CCH) 71,352 (final judgment
modified).
' For the legal history and philosophy behind the concept of subject matter jurisdiction
under the antitrust laws, see W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAws 29-86
(2d ed. 1973).
31 Id.
,0 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
" Sherman Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1970); Wilson Tariff Act § 76, 15 U.S.C. § 11 (1970).
42 See, e.g., United States v. 383, 340 Ounces of Quinine Derivatives, Admin. No. 92-242
(S.D.N.Y. 1928); United States v. ABL Canning Co., Eq. No. 54-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1930). The use
of antitrust seizure of property to establish jurisdiction is discussed in W. FUGATE, supra note
38, at 108-11.
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Why then has more use not been made of in rem jurisdiction
under the antitrust laws in recent years? The principal reason is
that under modern state long arm statutes and section 22 of the
Clayton Act, there is no longer significant difficulty in establishing
that foreign exporters have sufficient contacts with the United
States to be deemed personally liable for violations of law within
U.S. subject matter jurisdiction. For example, in the recent Angola
Coffee 3 case plaintiff coffee brokers charged other brokers, domestic
and foreign, with conspiring to fix the price of certain Angolan coffee
and to enforce certain restrictions on resales of this coffee. A defen-
dant Dutch coffee dealer was held to have transacted sufficient
business in the Southern District of New York to meet the test of
the New York long arm statute by virtue of the defendant sending
several telex communications to New York in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy."
A further illustration is the recent successful Sherman Act en-
forcement against the legendary international diamond cartel
against which prosecution had previously failed because of its lim-
ited contacts with the United States. 5 In 1974, the hub of the cartel
was charged in criminal and civil suits with illegally fixing the ter-
ritories resale prices of its United States distributors' industrial
diamonds.46 In this case the criminal charge was disposed of by a
plea of nolo contendere and the payment of a fine after the Depart-
ment of Justice began to take steps to confirm the effective service
of the criminal summons. The civil case was settled by a consent
decree which includes a provision for a substantial sum to be de-
posited by the defendant in escrow in a domestic bank which can
be drawn upon by the Department of Justice to finance any enforce-
ment order under the decree.47
While it is not clear precisely what lacunae section 337 will fill as
an antitrust statute, the ideas of the ITC afid its staff are eagerly
awaited. But there are pitfalls here which should, if possible, be
avoided. One such pitfall is the possibility for abuse inherent in the
concurrent jurisdiction of several competing antitrust agencies. If
13 Cofinco, Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co., [1975-21 TRADE CASES (CCH) 60,456.
44 Id.
" United States v. DeBeers Mines, 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
4 United States v. DeBeers Industrial Diamond Co., Ltd., Crim. Action No. 74C1151
(S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 10, 1974); Civ. Action No. 74 Civ. 5389 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 10, 1974).
11 United States v. DeBeers Industrial Diamond Div. (Ireland), Ltd., [1977] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 50,282.
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section 337 complaints are filed not because the ITC is the agency
best suited to hear a complaint and provide expeditious relief, but
because such a suit serves to wear down the respondent in a coordi-
nated litigation attack in several antitrust fora, all based on the
same facts and allegations, the ITC can lend itself to the undermin-
ing of competition. This possibility is at least raised in the recent
Color TV Sets and Stainless Steel Pipe" cases. In these cases section
337 complaints were but one in an interrelated series of actions by
domestic firms charging foreign competitors with violations of the
trade laws. Other statutes invoked were antidumping, countervail-
ing duty, private antitrust damage actions, and the escape clause,
as well as coordinated requests to the Congress and the Executive
for statutory protection. Coordinated litigation programs may even
raise issues of possible antitrust violations by complainants under
the Trucking Unlimited doctrine.49 There it was held that the Sher-
man Act is violated by a conspiracy unreasonably to restrain trade
through the intentional use of judicial and administrative adjudica-
tion procedures for that purpose. If a prior concurrent forum has
been entered for antitrust relief, the ITC might consider deferring
to that forum.
The current attitude of the ITC appears to be that the language
of section 337, in stating "[t]he Commission shall investigate any
alleged violation of this section," precludes any prosecutorial discre-
tion to avoid abuse of legal process. 50 This is questionable since this
language is similar to the prior statute which was in effect when the
ITC did refuse to hear Ceramic Tile and other earlier antitrust
cases. Moreover, the Congress itself approved a policy for the ITC
of regular deferral of complaints where prior investigations or pro-
ceedings are underway. 5' Prosecutorial discretion is inherent in the
power to prosecute.52
Section 603 of the Trade Act53 allows the ITC to conduct prelimi-
nary investigations on its own initiative. This provision can proba-
bly be used to conduct preliminary investigations terminable at an
early stage if found unmerited. Unlike section 337 investigations,
such section 603 investigations can be terminated without any nec-
"1 Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, Investigation No. 337-TA-29 (I.T.C. filed
Nov. 15, 1976).
,' Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
The "shall investigate" issue is discussed in Kaye & Plaia, supra note 2, at 62-63.
5' FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 7, at 195.
32 See generally A Symposium: Prosecutorial Discretion, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 379 (1976).
-13 19 U.S.C. § 2482 (Supp. V 1975).
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essary finding of injury or no injury. 4 Either under section 337 or
under section 603, the ITC might examine the nature of each com-
plaint, the likelihood of success, the motivations of the complain-
ant, and the impact on trade policy of a matter before it undertakes
a full formal investigation. The ITC might also consider at this
preliminary stage early offers of proof and other economical litiga-
tion management devices to lessen undue burdens for the ITC staff
and for meritorious respondents.
It is also important that the ITC consider establishing reasonable
jurisdictional guidelines and limits for section 337. Some recent
cases have suggested that the ITC will assert section 337 jurisdiction
over actions in domestic commerce merely because goods in that
commerce were, at an earlier stage, imported. In the Convertible
Game Tables patent case,55 the ITC began to consider remedies for
false advertising claims involving imported goods after they had
entered the U.S. and were within the flow of U.S. domestic com-
merce. The issue was apparently abandoned because the ITC felt
the patent-based exclusion order it issued in that case would make
redundant any further consumer protection cease-and-desist order.
The ITC did, however, assert its jurisdiction over conduct in United
States interstate commerce leaving the door open for possible future
enforcement overlap with the courts and with the Federal Trade
Commission, Justice Department and various state consumer pro-
tection agencies as to issues in United States domestic commerce.
V. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR PRO-COMPETITIVE ENFORCEMENT
OF SECTION 337
If section 337 is to be enforced as an antitrust law it must be
enforced so as to promote rather than inhibit competition. Antitrust
is concerned "primarily with the health of the competitive process,
not with the individual competitor who must sink or swim in com-
petitive enterprise."5 This should be the central concern of the ITC
as antitrust enforcer.
As a practical matter, given the language of the first part of sec-
tion 337 as well as its enforcement history, most of the ITC's en-
forcement is likely to remain the investigation of suspected patent
54 Id.
11 Convertible Game Tables and Components Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-34 (Tariff
Comm'n, filed Oct. 26, 1972), Tariff Comm'n Pub. No. 705 at 19 (Dec. 1974).
" Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond Block and Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
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and trademark infringements and fraudulent sales by foreign ex-
porters seeking to pass off their products in violation of the property
rights of domestic manufacturers. To enhance competition, the ITC
in such investigations should pay careful attention to the validity
of the allegedly threatened domestic property rights (especially pat-
ents). Relief should not be granted where there is reason to doubt
the validity of such rights. The ITC should also be open to investi-
gating fully possible defenses of respondents based on complain-
ants' alleged fraudulent procurement of such property rights. Evi-
dence of such fraud should lead to dismissal of the complaint and
should be referred to another antitrust enforcement agency for pos-
sible affirmative enforcement action. This sound advice has been
given, as well, by the Senate Finance Committee Report on the
Trade Act:
The Commission has also established the precedent of considering
U.S. Patents as being valid unless and until a court of competent
jurisdiction has held otherwise. However, the public policy re-
cently enunciated by the Supreme Court in the field of patent law
(cf., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969)) and the ultimate
issue of the fairness of competition raised by section 337, necessi-
tate that the Commission review the validity and enforceability of
patents, for the purposes of section 337, in accordance with con-
temporary legal standards when such issues are raised and are
adequately supported..5 7
Herewith are several additional suggestions for procompetitive
enforcement of section 337. First and foremost, the ITC should be
concerned that its attitude and standards be congruent with a com-
mitment to antitrust enforcement and the parameters of antitrust
doctrine. The ITC's announced incorporation by reference of the
corpus of existing antitrust laws as precedent in the Electronic
Audio Equipment case 58 is a constructive start. But this announce-
ment must be implemented to be meaningful. In this context, the
ITC should be particularly alert to the law as it applies to the
complexities of international antitrust. Important issues such as the
applicability of act of state and foreign government compulsion de-
fenses, and considerations of comity, must be recognized. 9
5' FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 7, at 196.
Certain Electronics Audio and Related Equipment, Investigation No. 337-TA-7 (I.T.C.
filed July 10, 1973), I.T.C. Pub. No. 768 at 31 (Apr. 1976).
11 The recognition of the doctrine of comity by the ITC is particularly important. A recent
statement on this issue as it effects the international antitrust enforcement policy of the
Department of Justice is discussed in Address of Attorney General Griffin Bell before the ABA
House of Delegates, August 8, 1977.
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Second, the ITC should exercise its power to exclude imports with
great restraint. Until 1974, exclusion of the offending products was
the only remedy. However, the Trade Act"0 gave the ITC the power
to issue cease-and-desist orders against offending unfair practices as
well. Curiously, the Congress apparently did not grant the ITC any
contempt power to apply in situations where there is a current
cease-and-desist order and a possible violation of that order. The
only ultimate sanction is the exclusion of the import. This exclusion
remedy is draconian in nature and has an inevitable "chilling ef-
fect" on the competitiveness of importers.
Publicity about a filed section 337 matter may cause buyers of
imports to change their purchases away from imports because of a
perceived risk of discontinued supplies, regardless of the eventual
outcome of the proceeding. The mere threat of a section 337 case
may have the same effect, particularly in the common situation
where an importer must spend time and resources to develop an
effective distribution chain in this country. Potential importers may
simply not want to involve themselves in handling an imported
product they understand to be vulnerable to a complicated and
expensive action which could lead ultimately to that product's ex-
clusion and their loss of investment.
The exclusion of imports restricts market supply and totally elim-
inates a competitor from the market for a violation which may be
minor.6 ' The chilling effect is even more severe when a temporary
exclusion is ordered at the early stages of a section 337 proceeding.
Such an order may be issued if the ITC "determines there is reason
to believe that there is a violation" of section 337.12 Temporary
exclusion orders victimize both the innocent importer and the
American consumer.
To protect the public interest the ITC should only use the exclu-
sion remedy as a last resort in the face of clear evidence that a cease-
and-desist order would be ineffective or has been previously vio-
lated. Cease-and-desist orders should be the usual and preferred
remedy for section 337 violations. In those cases where potentially
criminal conduct is suspected, whether by the complainant or the
respondent, the ITC should refer the matter to the Department of
10 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (Supp. V 1975).
11 The Department of Justice, in contrast, has the useful alternative of only seeking civil
relief enjoining continuation of anticompetitive practices. Injunctive relief with money dam-
ages for violation is not inherently anticompetitive nor inherently punitive as is exclusion.
S2 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (Supp. V 1975).
1978]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Justice for felony Sherman Act enforcement. Section 337 is not a
criminal statute. It should only be used to stop on-going anticompe-
titive and property rights violations, not to punish them.
The effect of exclusion orders on the broader framework of United
States international trade policy is also a matter for ITC review and
possible discretionary prosecutorial abstention in purported inter-
national predation cases. The United States is the only party which
provides private rights of action for certain unfair trading practices
covered by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)."
The GATT is an international diplomatic process by which many
nations are seeking, in an orderly manner, agreed upon definitions
of legitimate and unfair trading practices. Unilateral definitions by
the ITC isolated from this diplomatic process should be avoided.
For example, the past several administrations have uniformly taken
the position, as stated in the GATT Treaty," that rebates on exports
of value added taxes normally collected by a government on domes-
tic sales do not constitute an occasion for the importing nation
to impose a countervailing duty. Nor is it an unfair trade practice.
A section 337 complaint that certain foreign indirect taxation prac-
tices are unfair trade practices could put the ITC in the position of
examining and deciding the "unfairness" of trade policy issues ap-
propriately left to the Executive.
The investigatory time limits imposed on the ITC in the Trade
Act also raise problems which may suggest deference in a few espe-
cially difficult cases to other antitrust agencies not similarly con-
strained. While the judiciary and the Congress are legitimately con-
cerned with the complexity and glacial pace of antitrust litigation,
such prosecutions almost necessarily involve sophisticated eco-
nomic and legal issues, carefully presented after thorough discovery.
International antitrust matters often involve even greater complexi-
ties of international conflicts of laws, as well as mechanical prob-
lems such as document and testimony translations and discovery
abroad. The limited time period granted litigants in section 337
cases may simply, as a matter of law as well as a matter of practice,
prove inadequate to insure that all relevant issues are discovered,
presented, and argued in a manner consistent with fundamental
13 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5, A3, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. GATT was signed in Geneva on October 30, 1947 and is now the
principle instrument of world trade regulation.
4, Id. art. VT(4) prohibits countervailing duties "by reason of the exemption of such product
from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for consumption in the country
of origin or exportation or by reason of the refund of such duties or taxes."
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fairness and professionalism. It is becoming common practice for
discovery to be cut off in section 337 cases six or seven months from
the entry of the complaint. The ITC then runs a substantial risk of
deciding major cases on the basis of an incomplete, hastily-
assembled record. Incomplete and hastily-assembled decisions
serve no responsible interests.
The ITC must also be alert to the possibility that specific terms
of settlement, especially consent settlement, of some section 337
cases will have anticompetitive effects not in the public interest.
The important new development in ITC section 337 practice which
raises this concern is the recent consent settlement of the Color TV
Sets cases. 5 The use of consent decrees is, of course, an integral part
of antitrust enforcement. Most Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission cases are so settled. The challenge facing the
ITC is avoiding a settlement which fixes prices or allocates markets
between importers and exporters at the expense of U.S. consumers.
For example, negotiations to settle a predatory pricing section 337
matter could result in an attempt by the complainant domestic
industry to coerce respondent importers to agree to raise their prices
to an "acceptable" level. This is price fixing. Under United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,"6 an otherwise illegal agreement will not
be immunized by government knowledge, acquiescence, or even
approval. The unusual tripartite nature of section 337 litigation,
which involves litigation between competitors with the presence of
the ITC staff as an additional and often secondary party, may tempt
some litigants to engage in an illegal settlement. Consent decree
negotiations at the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission do not, in the ordinary case, involve negotiations with
and among competitors. These negotiations are done on a one-to-
one basis. In proceedings before the ITC, however, multi-party or
direct negotiations between competitors raise significantly greater
risks of anticompetitive conduct.
The ITC should take care to avoid the following hypothetical
situation. X, a Delaware corporation, has obsolete production facil-
ities and a patent of questionable validity. Its strongest competitor
is company Y, a German corporation with a modem plant and an
aggressive export policy. X files a section 337 complaint with the
ITC, and files a Sherman Act treble damage action in a Federal
District Court. The German firm can only afford to spend $100,000
0 42 Fed. Reg. 39,492 (1977).
" 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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to defend both legal actions. This fund is quickly exhausted in re-
sponding both to discovery in the antitrust litigation and in the ITC
staff inquiries. Y lacks the money properly to defend these legal
attacks, let alone to prosecute its strong counterclaim that X has
an invalid patent which it has misused. X approaches Y and offers
to settle the antitrust litigation and withdraw the section 337 com-
plaints if Y agrees to raise the export price of its product in the U.S.
market to that of the products of less efficient X. Reluctantly, Y
agrees. The ITC, at the request of X and Y, terminates the section
337 investigation. If such a settlement made on such facts were
today to come to the attention of the Justice Department, there is
a substantial possibility that the Department would convene a
criminal grand jury to investigate it.
Other possible opportunities for anticompetitive resolutions of
section 337 cases involving property rights should be avoided by the
ITC. Consent settlements could involve patent pools, cross licens-
ing, non-interference agreements, or licensing having market divi-
sion effects. These kinds of agreements are a ripe field for antitrust
scrutiny. A preferable solution to the problem of settlements which
are themselves antitrust violations, is a settlement which termi-
nates the anticompetitive practice but substitutes no new trade
restraint in its place.
VI. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN SECTION 337
CASES
The Department of Justice has several roles to play in the admin-
istration of section 337. First, it is the executive branch agency
entrusted by the Congress with the duty of investigating and prose-
cuting criminal and civil violations of the antitrust laws in interna-
tional trade. Because several recent section 337 cases have involved
issues of antitrust law and policy the Department of Justice has a
natural and substantial interest. The second basis for Department
of Justice involvement is statutory. One clause of the Trade Act
amendments to section 337 requires the ITC "[diuring the course
of each investigation" to "consult with and seek advice and infor-
mation" from the Department of Justice. 7 The same consultation
requirement is placed on the ITC with regard to the Federal Trade
Commission, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
and "such other departments as [the ITC] considers appropri-
V 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. V 1975).
[Vol. 8:47
JUSTICE DEP'T-§ 337
ate." 8 The current policy of the ITC (as stated in its regulations)
to fulfill this statutory obligation is to transmit to the agencies a
copy of all newly filed section 337 complaints, recommended deci-
sions of the Presiding Officer, and final ITC orders terminating
section 337 cases. In addition, the ITC specifically requests Depart-
ment of Justice comments on any recommended decisions for-
warded to the Commission by the Presiding Officer."
Third, the Department of Justice serves in an advisory capacity
to the President in his deliberations over whether section 337 reme-
dies should be vetoed for policy reasons. ITC section 337 recommen-
dations are forwarded to the President's Special Representative for
Trade Negotiation (STR) for action recommendation. The STR
consults with three levels of executive agency advisory groups. 70
Representatives from the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice sit on these groups along with representatives of other agen-
cies concerned with trade, consumer, and foreign policy issues. In
these review groups policy recommendations to the President are
formulated. The interest of the Department of Justice in this review
is the same as that given in the earlier stage of the section 337
proceeding: that the use of section 337 not undermine the antitrust
laws or promote protection instead of competition.
To avoid unnecessary conflicts, the ITC should expand consulta-
tions with the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Com-
mission at preliminary and investigatory stages of section 337 com-
plaints. Expanded consultations will draw advice from agencies
with experience in both the legal and practical areas of international
antitrust enforcement. It is important, however, that the advice
given be made on the basis of relevant information. For that reason,
the ITC staff should make investigatory files accessible to the other
antitrust agencies subject to appropriate safeguards of confidential-
ity by such consulting agencies. In its report on the Trade Act, the
Senate Finance Committee advised the ITC to seek the early advice
of relevant agencies, by saying, "[s]uch agencies will often have
information and insight which is relevant to the Commission's de-
termination of whether there is reason to believe, or there is, a
violation of section 337. ' '71 Only by having access to all relevant
18 Id. § 1337(b)(2).
19 C.F.R. §§ 210.13, 210.14 (1977).
70 These review groups, established in the regulations issued by the Special Trade Repre-
sentative are the Trade Policy Staff Committee, the Trade Policy Review Group, and the
cabinet-level Trade Policy Committee. 15 C.F.R. pts. 2002, 2003 (1977).
11 FINANCE COMM. REP., supra note 7, at 195.
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information can other agencies aid the ITC in efficient and procom-
petitive resolution of worthy section 337 complaints.
VII. CONCLUSION
Section 337 started as a protectionist adjunct to the antidumping
law. In 1922, when debating the original statute Senator Smoot
declared:
If any doubt whatever exists to the effectiveness of the tariff
rates and the provisions of the elastic tariff as means to protect the
coal tar dye industries, the addition of this effective unfair compe-
tition statute should remove it. We have in this measure an anti-
dumping law with teeth in it-one which will reach all forms of
unfair competition.72
This protectionist purpose largely remained over the years, even
when section 337 became primarily a patent rights enforcement
statute. However, the present chairman and members of the ITC
staff say that this purpose will change. Armed with congressional
mandate, section 337 will now, for the first time, be enforced as an
antitrust law.
The Department of Justice is undoubtedly prepared to cooperate
with the ITC to try to help make section 337 a law which protects
legitimate property rights consistent with the promotion of competi-
tion in domestic markets and the avoidance of discrimination
against imports. If, however, section 337 is used to frustrate signifi-
cant competition and protect oligopolistic American producers at
the expense of the American consumer, it is likely that the Depart-
ment of Justice will intervene and speak out before the ITC, take
independent enforcement action where appropriate, and advise the
President to reject ITC section 337 remedy recommendations.
72 62 CONG. Rac. 5879 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1922).
